Does trade policy impact food and agriculture global value chain participation of Sub-Saharan African countries? by Balié, Jean et al.
Does trade policy impact food and agriculture global value 
chain participation of Sub­Saharan African countries?
Article  (Accepted Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Balié, Jean, Del Prete, Davide, Magrini, Emiliano, Montalbano, Pierluigi and Nenci, Silvia (2019) 
Does trade policy impact food and agriculture global value chain participation of Sub-Saharan 
African countries? American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 101 (3). pp. 773-789. ISSN 0002-
9092 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/83838/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
Running head: Trade policy and food and agriculture GVCs 
1 
 
Forthcoming in AJAE 
Does trade policy impact food and agriculture global value chain participation of 
Sub-Saharan African countries? 




The emergence of food and agriculture global value chains (GVCs) is challenging the way scholars look at trade 
data and policy makers conduct their trade policies. The common perception is that Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries, unlike most Latin American and Asian countries, are not deeply integrated into global production 
networks. Consequently, it is believed that their border protection policies may have a limited impact on GVC 
participation. This paper challenges this conventional knowledge in two ways. First, by decomposing bilateral 
gross export into its value added components, it shows that the sectoral and bilateral SSA participation in GVC 
for food and agriculture is substantial. Second, it demonstrates that trade policies impact backward and forward 
value chain linkages. These results call for a refinement of trade policy priorities in SSA. 
Keywords: Global value chains, agriculture, food, trade policy, gravity model, Sub-Saharan Africa. 
JEL codes: F14, L23, O11, O55, Q17. 
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Since the last decades of the 20th century, food and agriculture global value chains (GVCs) keep growing 
as products cross borders multiple times and the international production networks, dominated by modern 
food processors and retailers, become more vertically organized (Reardon et al, 2003; Minten et al., 
2009; Greenville et al., 2017).i Meanwhile, agro-food trade has more than quadrupled in nominal terms 
during the past three decades, from USD 230 billion in 1980 to almost USD 1,100 billion in 2010; a 
dramatic increase driven by several factors including GVC growth. Indeed half of this total agro-food 
trade can be considered of intermediate usage for global production processes (Maertens and Swinnen, 
2015; OECD, 2016).ii These developments are challenging the way agriculture and food trade data are 
used and interpreted because conventional statistics have become increasingly misleading as a measure 
of the value produced by any particular country (Koopman et al., 2014). For instance, using gross trade 
statistics, the final producer may appear to generate most of the value of goods, while the role of countries 
providing inputs upstream – such as countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) – could be largely 
underestimated. 
However, while the literature on GVCs has been abundant (e.g. Gereffi et al. 2005; Giuliani et al., 
2008; Costinot et al., 2013; Del Prete and Rungi, 2017),  the effects of trade policies on the emergence 
of GVCs have only been theoretically and empirically analyzed relatively recently (Antràs and Staiger, 
2012; Blanchard and Matschke, 2015; Gawande et al., 2015). At the same time, the specter of 
protectionism is at its strongest since the late ‘80s as value chain concerns figure prominently in 
international trade debates related to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).  
This analysis applied to the agricultural and food sectors of SSA countries is of primary importance 
for policy making and trade negotiations. Firstly, because protection levels in these two sectors are still 
the highest in the world (see Figure 1A in the Appendix). Secondly, the agriculture sector in these 
countries still generates about 25% of the gross domestic product (GDP), or 50% if we look at the broader 
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agribusiness sector, and involves roughly 65% of the local population, mostly in family farming activities 
(Alliance for a Green revolution in Africa -AGRA, 2016). The common perception is that SSA countries, 
unlike most Latin American and Asian countries (Gereffi, 1996, 1999; Montalbano et al., 2016, 2018; 
Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2015) are not deeply integrated into global production networks and 
consequently their border protection policies may have a limited impact on GVC participation. This 
paper challenges this conventional knowledge in two ways. First, we measure the participation of SSA 
countries in the agriculture and food GVCs, i.e. we unpack the different stages of the production process 
to identify the contribution of each country to trade flows in terms of value added content. To this aim, 
we apply for the first time in the case of SSA the bilateral gross exports decomposition method developed 
by Wang et al. (2013) (Wang, Wei, and Zhu, hereinafter WWZ) to the EORA multi-region input-output 
tables (MRIO). These tables provide a contiguous, continuous dataset for the period 1990-2013 for 186 
countries - of which 43 are from SSA (Lenzen et al., 2012; 2013) (see Section 2 and Supplementary 
Appendix online for additional details). 
Second, we rely on a structural gravity model to study whether and how bilateral import tariffs as 
well as shifts in trade regimes associated with regional trade agreements (RTAs) affect the agriculture 
and food GVC participation. More specifically, we examine the SSA countries’ backward participation 
(i.e., the use of foreign inputs for exports) and forward participation (i.e., the use of domestic 
intermediates in third country exports).  
Our findings are in line with the most recent literature which suggests that Africa is more integrated 
into GVCs than many other developing regions (Foster-McGregor et al., 2015). It also highlights that 
global linkages have been increasing over time. Much of Africa’s involvement into GVCs is however in 
upstream production activities, i.e. specializing in providing primary inputs to firms in countries further 
down the chain (Del Prete et al., 2017). Finally, our empirical analysis shows that bilateral trade policies 
are key determinants of both backward and forward GVC participation in the food sector and, to a lesser 
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extent, in the agricultural sector. These results are consistent for the aggregate case - where we use the 
entire global dataset - and for the subset of SSA countries. Therefore, trade policies appear to have an 
important “chain effect” suggesting that a restriction imposed by one country not only dampens partner 
countries’ exports but also the country itself through value chain linkages. This confirms the theoretical 
argument whereby optimal tariff policy no longer exclusively depends on the location of the imported 
good, but also on the nationality of the value added content embodied in that good (Blanchard et al., 
2016). 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the methodology for 
decomposing gross trade in value added terms and a comprehensive map of agro-food GVC participation 
in SSA and relative trade partners. Section 3 describes the identification and the empirical strategy. 
Section 4 presents the outcomes of the empirical analysis and some robustness checks. Finally, Section 
5 concludes and suggests policy implications. 
 
Decomposing gross trade in value added terms: methodology and data  
In this work, we calculate the value added embedded in gross exports using the methodology developed 
by WWZ, as it generalizes the accounting framework proposed by Koopman et al. (2014) from a country-
level perspective to one that decomposes gross trade flows at the sector, bilateral, or bilateral-sector level 
(see Supplementary Appendix online for additional details). It also allows us to identify and account for 
the “pure double counting” term (PDC) that arises when intermediate goods cross borders back and forth 
multiple times.iii   
Thus, we exploit five key components of value added exports:  
i) the direct domestic value added (dirDVA), that is, the domestic value added in intermediates and 
final goods exports absorbed and consumed by direct importers. Since it is the result of a single exchange 
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of goods it does not enter into the computation of GVC participation and, consequently, in our empirical 
exercise we use it as a proxy for gross exports; 
ii) the indirect domestic value added (DVX), that is, the domestic value added in intermediate goods 
further re-exported by the partner country. It measures the joint participation of the bilateral trade partners 
in a GVC since it contains the exporter’s value added of a specific sector that passes through the direct 
importer for a (or some) stage(s) of production before it reaches third countries (or eventually returns 
homeiv). More specifically, it captures the contribution of the domestic sector to the exports of other 
countries and indicates the extent of involvement in GVC for relatively upstream industries. In our 
empirical analysis, we use this component as a measure of forward GVC participation;  
iii) the foreign value added (FVA) used in the production of a country’s exports, which consists of 
the value added contained in intermediate inputs imported from abroad, exported in the form of final or 
intermediate goods. We use this component as a measure of backward GVC participation.  
Finally, to isolate the bilateral relationship of the trade flow which involves only partner and reporter 
countries, we identify two further sub-components:  
iv) the MVA, that is the share of the foreign value added that comes exclusively from the direct 
importing country;   
v) the dirRDV, that is the share of indirect valued added that ultimately returns home exclusively 
via the partner country. 
Data used in this work come from the EORA - MRIO database, which provides a contiguous, 
continuous dataset for the period 1990-2013 (Lenzen et al., 2012; 2013). EORA contains data for 186 
countries - of which 43 are in SSA - and 25 harmonized ISIC-type sectors.v In this study, we focus on 
the agriculture (ISIC codes 1, 2) and food and beverages (ISIC codes 15, 16) sectors (see Supplementary 
Appendix online for additional information).  
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Mapping food and agriculture GVCs 
Thanks to the use of the EORA dataset we are able to disentangle the domestic and foreign contribution 
in value added of bilateral exports. Therefore, we can get a comprehensive picture of agriculture and 
food GVC participation for a single country across all partners in each sector.vi To this end, we sum up 
the DVX, the FVA and the PDC components to provide an overall GVC participation index (Koopman 
et al., 2011; Rahman and Zhao, 2013). The higher (or lower) the value of the GVC participation index, 
the larger (or smaller) the participation of a country in GVC. The maximum value of GVC index is 1, in 
the extreme case where gross exports are entirely determined by GVC related activities.  
Figure 1a shows the aggregate GVC participation index in 2013 across all sectors and by regions, 
distinguishing the three components: DVX, FVA, and PDC. As a preliminary remark, we can note that 
the EU27 and ASEAN countries are the most integrated.vii Nevertheless, the SSA participation rate is 
surprisingly high (40%), matching the level found for China and India. This means that almost half of 
all trade activities in SSA are GVC related. This finding is in line with the literature applying other 
decomposition methods (see, among others, African Development Bank, 2015; Foster-McGregor et al., 
2015; Kowalski et al., 2015).  
Looking at the different components of the GVC participation, Africa (especially North Africa, 
denoted NA) emerges as the best performer in providing value added to other countries to be further re-
exported (DVX). About 25% of the domestic value added produced in SSA are inputs for other countries’ 
exports (over 35% in the case of NA). These figures can be compared with those of the Middle East 
(25%). They are higher than those of the EU27, China, and NAFTA that register rates of around 20% 
(see the DVX component in Figure 1a). Note that relative to other methods, the WWZ methodology 
allows us to properly isolate the pure double counted term (i.e., PDC in the figure) which appears to be 
substantial (e.g., 12% for the EU; 4% for SSA). 
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Figure 1b shows the emergence of the international fragmentation of production over the last two 
decades. Although GVC participation is increasing worldwide, China experienced the largest increase 
after its WTO accession (that took place in 2001), whereas the SSA participation went up to 40% in 
2013, from a value of 37% in 1995. 
Figure 2 and 3 report the sectoral contributions of agriculture and food using the measures of GVC 
participation described above.viii Figure 2 shows that the agricultural sector in SSA is the most involved 
in GVCs if compared to other regions of the world (Figure 2a) and its participation is increasing over 
time (Figure 2b). About 3% out of 40% of total GVC participation stems from the agriculture sector, i.e. 
a contribution equal to 7% across all 25 EORA sectors. For instance, the same figure for the EU27 is 
only 2%. Furthermore, the sector presents a relatively higher domestic value added components used by 
other countries’ exports (DVX) with respect to foreign value added components (FVA), confirming its 
upstream position along the chain where it acts as a supplier of intermediate inputs. 
For the food sector (Figure 3), the EU27 and Latin American countries present the highest 
participation rates (Figure 3a). We find that 4% (1.7% out of 40%) of the total GVC participation in SSA 
is due to food activities and this share is relatively stable over time (Figure 3b). Unlike the agricultural 
sector, the position of SSA lies closer to the final consumers (i.e., downstream position) as shown by the 
more balanced ratio between the DVX and FVA components.  
To sum up, SSA takes part in GVCs by contributing mainly to the upstream phases, being confined 
to low value added stages of production, but with differences in value added content between agriculture 
and food exports.  
However, these overall figures hide a substantial degree of heterogeneity within the region. To shed 
more light on this, in Table 1A (Appendix A), we report the same GVC components for the 43 SSA 
countries present in our dataset, together with the sectoral contribution of agriculture and food in 2013. 
Some SSA countries, such as DR Congo, Ethiopia, Lesotho and Guinea, register relatively high 
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involvement in the international fragmentation of production compared with the other countries in the 
region. This is most probably due to the bias of their production structure towards the export of natural 
resources (DR Congo) or the small size of their economy (Lesotho). Others, such as Benin, Chad and 
Mali, seem to be more excluded from the global market, likely because of geographical remoteness 
and/or lack of resources. Note also that in almost all SSA countries, GVC participation mainly consists 
in supplying inputs to other countries’ exports (DVX), whereas only a few of them participate primarily 
as buyers of foreign inputs for their exports (FVA). In the latter group, Ethiopia is a peculiar case. It is 
among the most integrated countries in GVCs exhibiting one of the highest levels of contribution of the 
agricultural sector to the total GVC participation in the region (31%). Other SSA countries where the 
contribution of the agricultural sector to the total GVC participation is quite remarkable, i.e. above 30%, 
include Côte d’Ivoire (33%), Ghana (34%), Kenya (30%), Madagascar (38%), Malawi (39%) and 
Uganda (32%). Finally, the last column of Table 1A clearly shows that the contribution of the food sector 
to the countries’ GVC participation is, on average, lower than what is observed for the agricultural sector 
with rates usually below 10%. The only countries registering noteworthy performances are Côte d’Ivoire 
(15%), Kenya (15%), Mauritania (21%), Namibia (28%), Senegal (42%), and Swaziland (16%).  
As mentioned above, the WWZ (2013) decomposition method also allows us to disentangle the value 
added components of the bilateral gross trade flows. In section 3 of the Supplementary Appendix online, 
we report the value added components (DVX and FVA) of SSA exports by groups of partner countries 
across the main destination regions (in percentages), namely Europe, NAFTA, LAC, Africa, South and 
East Asia in both agriculture and food sectors. Not surprisingly, most likely due to the colonial legacy, ix 
the European countries (EU27) are the main importers of value added exports from the SSA countries 
for both sectors. While the percentage of FVA absorbed by EU27 is around or below 50%, the percentage 
of DVX is 68% for agriculture and 62% for food.x The very high share of the DVX component of SSA 
countries to the EU27 suggests that the agricultural and food products of SSA are first exported to the 
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main European hubs such as Netherlandsxi, Germany and the UK and, once processed, further re-
exported to third countries. At the same time, the relatively low percentage of FVA absorbed by the EU27 
may be associated with the fact that for the SSA producers, it appears difficult to have direct access to 
the European market because of issues related to consumers’ preferences as well as public and private 
safety and quality standards (Lee et al., 2010).  
Identification and empirical strategy  
The remaining part of this paper analyzes whether and how protective measures at the border affect 
participation in GVCs. In this respect, the most recent literature underlines two potential effects of 
bilateral tariffs: i) a “magnification effect”, whereby goods that cross national borders multiple times 
incur multiple tariff costs. As such, tariffs are applied to gross imports, even though the value added 
content may be only a fraction of this amount. Different ways of international involvement, notably 
upstream or downstream participation, shape the extent to which countries are affected by this cost 
magnification (Yi, 2003; 2010; Muradov, 2017); ii) a “chain effect” which influences all the stages of a 
GVC and, consequently, a country’s backward and forward participation. In terms of forward 
participation, a depressing impact is expected on the domestic value added content of a country embodied 
in partner countries’ exports. This is because, by reducing the gains for foreign producers of final goods, 
tariffs also hurt their upstream domestic suppliers. In terms of backward participation, when import-
competing sectors use foreign inputs, tariffs allow to pass some protectionist rents from the domestic 
producers on to upstream foreign input suppliers. This could represent an incentive for foreign suppliers 
to move to those countries/sectors to get the benefits of the protection (Blanchard et al., 2016). Moreover, 
while the majority of observed protective measures are bilateral, some of them are the result of free trade 
agreements or customs unions which can affect GVC participation differently, entailing a broader notion 
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of preferential trade regimes, including rules of origins and possible non-tariff issues (Curran and Nadvi, 
2015).  
This analysis is of primary importance in policy making and negotiations in the agricultural and food 
sectors of SSA countries, since the protection levels that countries confer to these two sectors is the 
highest in the world (Bown, 2015; Caliendo et al., 2016). As Figure 1A in the Appendix shows, the 
average level of tariff rates is still above 10% for agriculture (Figure 1Aa) and well above 15% for food 
(Figure 1Ab). Also, while the number of signed RTAs is increasing worldwide, SSA countries are less 
involved in trade agreements, with about 20 trade agreements signed by each SSA country on average, 
well below the level of OECD economies (see Figure 2A in Appendix). 
To assess empirically the relation between trade policy and GVC participation, we rely on the well-
established gravity model which has been used as a workhorse for analyzing the determinants of trade 
flows for over fifty years (Tinbergen, 1962; Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1989; Deardorff, 1998; Eaton 
and Kortum, 2002; Chaney, 2018). While the original gravity equation made use of countries’ size, 
bilateral distance, and a set of dummy variables such as common languages, colonial ties and common 
land borders, to explain bilateral flows, different specifications of the structural form of the gravity 
equation have recently emerged. These revised empirical specifications of the gravity model rely on 
country-time and country-pair fixed effects (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006; De Benedictis and Taglioni, 
2011; Head and Mayer, 2014; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Piermartini and Yotov, 2016): country-time 
fixed effects control for time-varying factors that could influence trade and account for the ‘multilateral 
resistance’ terms (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003); xii  country-pair fixed effects account for 
endogeneity bias between bilateral protection and trade flows.xiii We apply this revised specification in 
order to provide a more grounded theoretical underpinnings and a more parsimonious econometric 
specification. We thus identify the effects of trade policy without quantifying separately the effects of 
the other time-varying gravity determinants - such as economic size - and bilateral time-invariant 
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characteristics - such as geographical distance and common language. In this setting, these gravity 
determinants are still controlled for but absorbed by country-time fixed effects (in the case of time-
varying determinants) and pairs fixed effects (in the case of bilateral time-invariant characteristics). The 
use of a full set of country-time and pair fixed effects also absorbs all variations in multilateral MFN 
tariffs in our data.   
We identify the effect of bilateral trade policies on the participation of SSA countries in the food and 
agricultural GVCs using the following equation: 
(1)               𝐺𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1tariff𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2rta𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                         
where i identifies the reporter country, j the partner country, and t denotes time. GVC stands for selected 
bilateral components of exports in value added as outlined in Section 2. More specifically, we first use 
as dependent variables the dirDVA, DVX and FVA components separately. The variable dirDVA provides 
a baseline estimate to proxy the impact of bilateral trade policies on gross exports, in that it captures the 
part of value added that does not enter into the GVCs (i.e., it does not entail any international production 
fragmentation). DVX and FVA are used as measures of forward and backward GVC participation, 
respectively, since they capture the share of value added flows belonging to a production process globally 
fragmented.  
Then, we proxy bilateral protection by using the applied tariff rate in agriculture (food) of the partner 
country j to the reporter i (tariffjit)
xiv and a dummy variable for the mutual participation to the same trade 
agreement (rtajit).
xv The expected sign of 𝛼1 is negative, which would imply that the tariff faced by 
country i is not only hampering its capacity to exchange goods for final consumption in j (DirDVA), as 
in the standard framework, but also its backward and forward participation (FVA and DVX) because of 
the concurrence of both the magnification and the chain effects illustrated above. The expected sign of 
𝛼2 is instead ambigous. On the one hand, we may find a positive impact, since RTAs are meant to 
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introduce a broader set of bilateral preferences between members and include possible non-tariff issues 
such as general regulatory policies (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). On the other hand, this positive impact 
could be, totally or partially, offset by strict rules of origins (i.e., request for additional domestic stages 
of production by the importing country), prolonged phase-in periods, as well as a high influence of 
multilateral inputs on foreign value added that do not directly benefit from bilateral preferences (Curran 
and Nadvi, 2015; Blanchard et al., 2016).  
Finally 𝜃𝑖𝑡, 𝛾𝑗𝑡   and 𝜙𝑖𝑗   represent the above-mentioned reporter-time, partner-time and country-pair 
fixed effects, respectively, while 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the error term. Standard errors are clustered by country-pair to 
control for dyadic error correlation, as the use of country-pair fixed effects is supposed to not fully 
account for this further source of bias. This is because trade flows between i and j are serially correlated 
with all the other country pairs that include also i or j (Cameron and Miller, 2015). All the continous 
variables in eq. 1 are in natural logs including the value added components of bilateral exports which are 
reported in monetary values (thousands of US dollars) and not as exports’ shares as in the descriptive 
analysis (section 2). In such a log-log setting, the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities.   
However, we acknowledge that the gravity approach needs improvements to take on board the key 
features of value added trade, such as the fact that bilateral value added flows do not depend only on 
bilateral trade costs but also on costs with third countries through which value added transits from source 
to destination. As Johnson and Noguera (2012) show, the relative importance of these additional effects 
varies significantly across countries and types of trade costs. Also, Baldwin and Taglioni (2014) 
underline that when trade in parts and components is relevant, GDPs in both the exporting and importing 
countries are poor proxies for supply and demand. Therefore, to soften the additional bias due to value 
added trade, we re-estimate eq. 1 using only the direct bilateral chain relationships between the reporter 
and the partner (eq. 2). To do this, we use as dependent variables the amount of domestic value added 
re-exported that ultimately returns home via the partner country (dirRDV), and the foreign value added 
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that comes from the direct importing country (MVA). In this case, the gravity equation takes the following 
form: 
(2)   𝐷𝑖𝑟𝐺𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1tariff𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2tariff𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3rta𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝑗𝑡 + 𝜓𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡                         
where 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝐺𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡  is alternatively dirRDV and MVA and, as above, tariffjit and rtajit are the applied tariff 
rate in agriculture (food) of the partner country j to the reporter i and the dummy variable signalling the 
mutual participation to the same trade agreement. However, differently from the previous specification, 
here we also control for the effect of a country’s restrictive measure on its own GVC participation 
(tariffijt), that is the applied tariff rate of the reporter i to partner j. Such a link is virtually non-existent 
except in the case of vertically fragmented production processes whereby some of the domestic value 
added exported may be embodied in imports from the direct partner country (dirRDV) or the foreign 
value added embodied in exports may come from the direct importing country (MVA). In the first case, 
we expect a negative sign on 𝛽2. In the second case, the effect is more ambiguous, as the negative impact 
of the import taxation on the foreign value added sourced from the partner country may be 
counterbalanced by the development of import-competing sectors. This may eventually raise the 
incentive of the direct importer to increase its input supply by taking advantage of the protectionist rents 
(Blanchard et al., 2016). Finally 𝜗𝑖𝑡, 𝜏𝑗𝑡   and 𝜓𝑖𝑗   represent the usual set of reporter-time, partner-time 
and country-pair fixed effects, respectively, while 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the error term. 
Table 2A in Appendix reports the variables applied in the empirical analysis and the related main 
descriptive statistics. 
Empirical analysis 
Tables 1 and 2 report the estimates for eq. 1 and 2  over the period 1990-2013 both for the entire sample 
of 186 countries included in the EORA dataset and for the sub-sample of 43 SSA countries, respectively. 
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The first five columns (from 1a to 5a) report the coefficients for the agricultural sector, whereas the 
second set of five columns (from 1b to 5b) report the same estimates for the food sector. 
As expected, Table 1 shows that the average bilateral tariff faced by the reporters’ exports (tariffji) is 
negatively correlated with the direct domestic value added of the reporting countries’ exports (dirDVA). 
This is true for both the agriculture and food sector (columns 1a and 1b). If we bear in mind that dirDVA 
is the value added component that best proxies gross exports, the above estimated coefficients reflect the 
general negative impact of bilateral protection on agriculture and food trade flows. More interestingly, 
the table further shows the negative and statistically significant impact of the partner country border 
protection on the reporter country’s forward (DVX) and backward (FVA) GVC participation in 
agriculture (columns 2a and 3a) and food (columns 2b and 3b). These results show that bilateral trade 
protection is not only hampering the single exchange of goods between two countries, it is also 
undermining the capacity of a country to participate in longer value chains characterized by multiple 
exchanges of intermediates and final goods.  
Columns 4a and 5a, and columns 4b and 5b report the results of eq. 2 on the direct bilateral chain 
relationships between the reporter and the partner. The coefficients on tariffji are still significant and 
similar in magnitude to those of DVX and FVA variables, confirming the goodness of fit of our estimates. 
The estimated coefficients associated with the bilateral tariffs applied by the reporter country to its 
partners (tariffij, second row Table 1) show a negative effect on the direct forward participation (dirRDV, 
columns 4a and 4b) and the direct backward participation (MVA, columns 5a and 5b). However, these 
effects are statistically significant only for the food sector. All in all, this result indicates that where 
international fragmentation of production prevails, a country’s GVCs performance does not only depend 
on the level of protection it faces from other countries, but also on its own level of import taxation in the 
same sector. There is a main policy recommendation to be derived from this finding on the so called 
chain effect of tariffs.  If a country increases its import taxation with the aim to support the development 
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of the domestic sector for example, this same country should expect to pay a cost in terms of involvement 
into GVCs.  
Finally, the third row in Table 1 shows the effects of the existing preferential trade regimes (RTAs). 
The coefficients indicate a positive and significant impact of the RTAs on almost all the components in 
the food case (columns from 1b to 4b), except for the direct bilateral backward participation (MVA). This 
confirms the positive effect of the vertical integration between partners and downsizes the potential trade 
diversion effect of the RTA on the GVC participation for this sector. Trade agreements are key, as they 
can determine meaningful shifts in trade regime – also in terms of rules of origins - with pervasive effects 
on GVC participation of source countries apart from pure variations in applied tariffs. However, a 
different picture emerges if we look at the impact of RTA on the agricultural GVC participation (columns 
from 1a to 5a), where trade agreements are no longer statistically significant (except for dirRDV).  
Table 2 reports the same analysis for the sub-sample of SSA countries. Results appear in line with 
those of Table 1. As can be seen in the first row of Table 2, the average bilateral tariff applied by the 
partner countries to the reporters’ exports (tariffji) is negatively correlated with all the components of 
trade in value added, but it is significant only for the food sector. In the second row of the same table – 
referring to the tariffs applied by the reporter country to its partners (tariffij) – the coefficient on dirRDV 
in the food sector (column 4b) is the only one significantly correlated with the dependent variable. Yet, 
it is relevant because it highlights the importance of the chain effect of tariffs also in SSA economies. 
Finally, looking at the third row, we see that the estimated impacts of RTAs on forward GVC 
participation are positive although only marginally statistically significant in agriculture. By contrast, 
these estimated impacts are weakly significant and negative in the food sector. This latter result highlights 
the likely trade diversion effects of strict bilateral regulations associated with RTAs. 
To conclude, in line with the theoretical arguments, our results point to: i) a depressing role of the 
importer’s tariffs on all components of value added exports; ii) a negative effect of the exporter own 
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import tariffs on the domestic value added that returns home (a chain effect) in the food sector, both at 
the global level and for SSA. However, the effect on the foreign value added sourced from the partner 
country appears ambiguous, and iii) a consistently positive effect of regional trade agreements on forward 
GVC participation in the food sector at the global level. However, this latter result is not confirmed in 
the case of SSA countries. These trade diversion effects do not seem to emerge in agriculture where we 
consistently find a significant and positive relation of RTAs on the direct forward GVC participation 
both at the global level and for SSA countries.  
We further test whether our previous findings on the effects of bilateral trade policies on backward 
and forward GVC participation are robust to different empirical checks. We first verify whether 
discernable differences can be registered running the same estimates by using weighted measures of 
tariffs instead of the simple ones. On the one side, these measures can adequately take into account the 
strong heterogeneity of tariffs characterized by different elasticity of demand. On the other, since weights 
are built using import flows, these measures may cause additional sources of endogeneity. To soften this 
issue, we apply one year lagged weighted tariffs.xvi In Table 3 and Table 4 we report the results. The 
main findings are still valid, i.e. tariffs faced by partner countries are likely to discourage GVC 
participation. Specifically, both at the global level and for SSA countries, the estimated coefficients 
associated with the bilateral tariffs applied by the partner countries (tariffji) – in agriculture and food – 
are significantly and negatively correlated with the levels of bilateral value added flows. The “chain 
effect” of trade policy is confirmed at the global level, also for the direct forward GVC participation 
(dirRDV) in agriculture. In the case of  Sub-Saharan Africa, a significant and negative effect is again 
found but only for direct forward GVC participation (second row, column 4b, Table 4) in the food sector. 
Also the pattern of RTAs coefficients are confirmed and are found to be positively associated with value 
added trade in the food sector (at the global level) and with direct forward GVC participation in 
agriculture.xvii 




This study closely analyzes the international fragmentation of food and agricultural production processes 
and its relationship with trade policy. By exploiting the EORA database and applying the gross exports 
decomposition method provided by WWZ to these data, we show that despite low gross trade shares at 
the global level, SSA countries are deeply involved in GVCs and often more than many other developing 
regions. Moreover, their GVC participation is still limited to upstream production stages, i.e. the region 
is relatively specialized in providing primary inputs to countries closer to the final consumers.  
Second, our empirical results highlight the relevance and significance of tariffs and RTAs in 
explaining the heterogeneity of GVC participation. We find that the level of tariff faced by countries is 
not only hampering their capacity to exchange goods for final consumption, as in the standard 
framework, but also their backward and forward GVC participation. Furthermore, we also find evidence 
of a ‘chain effect’ of the exporter own import tariffs, i.e. border protection measures may depress the 
domestic value added used by trading partners that ultimately returns home. This has possibly important 
policy implications, since trade policies no longer exclusively depend on the location of the imported 
goods, rather on the nationality of the value added content embodied in traded goods. Consequently, 
there may be a need to reformulate trade policy priorities, especially in the food sector.  
While we believe these results provide scholars and policymakers with a useful framework for testing 
the importance of policy measures on bilateral GVC relationships, we also acknowledge that more should 
be done both in the development of new and improved data, such as more disaggregated MRIO tables, 
and in the analysis of the entire set of protectionist measures, as nowadays tariffs represent only a fraction 
of the overall trade costs. Because it was beyond the scope of this paper,  future research on GVCs in 
SSA or other regions could investigate the relative importance of factors that could influence increased 
participation into GVCs including, for example, better infrastructures, improved logistics, guaranteed 
Running head: Trade policy and food and agriculture GVCs 
18 
 
property rights and enforced contracts, as well as more complete financial and credit markets. 
Methodologically, it could also be interesting to analyse the short and long run effects of change in tariffs 
as well as the value of some numerical tariff multiplier due to the chain effect. 
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Figure 1. GVC participation index by world areas (all sectors) 
    
1a: Components (2013)                                                                    1b: Trend 
Notes: PDC stands for pure double counting, FVA foreign value added and DVX indirect value added. GVC participation = PDC + FVA + 
DVX. Source: Authors’ elaboration on EORA data 
Figure 2. Agriculture GVC participation index by world areas 
      
2a: Components (2013)                                                                    2b: Trend 
Notes: PDC stands for pure double counting, FVA foreign value added and DVX indirect value added. GVC participation = PDC + FVA + 
DVX. Source: Authors’ elaboration on EORA data 
 
Figure 3. Food GVC participation index by world areas 
     
3a: Components (2013)                                                                    3b: Trend 
Notes: PDC stands for pure double counting, FVA foreign value added and DVX indirect value added. GVC participation = PDC + FVA + 
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Table 1. Baseline: agriculture and food GVCs components for All countries 
      Agriculture         Food     
  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) 
Dep Var: dirDVA DVX FVA dirRDV MVA dirDVA DVX FVA dirRDV MVA 
                     
tariff rate (applied mean)_ji -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.004** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
tariff rate (applied mean)_ij    -0.002 0.002    -0.012*** -0.007*** 
    (0.002) (0.002)    (0.001) (0.002) 
RTA (yes=1)^ 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.018*** -0.002 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.029*** 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
           
Observations 541,522 541,395 544,209 435,017 433,773 542,307 542,189 544,209 435,320 434,007 
R-squared 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.997 0.997 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.998 0.998 
Country pair fe YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Reporter*year fe YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Partner*year fe YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country pair clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
^ three years lags from the entry into force of the agreement        
Note: dirDVA stands for direct domestic value added, DVX indirect value added, FVA foreign value added, dirRDV domestic value added that returns home directly 









Running head: Trade policy and food and agriculture GVCs 
26 
 
Table 2. Baseline: agriculture and food GVCs components for SSA countries 
      Agriculture         Food     
  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) 
Dep Var: dirDVA DVX FVA dirRDV MVA dirDVA DVX FVA dirRDV MVA 
                     
tariff rate (applied mean)_ji -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.021*** -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.017*** -0.019*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
tariff rate (applied mean)_ij    0.003 0.004    -0.008** -0.001 
    (0.005) (0.006)    (0.003) (0.004) 
RTA (yes=1)^ 0.007 0.013 0.007 0.055*** 0.010 -0.035* -0.024 -0.035* 0.024 -0.012 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024) 
           
Observations 126,533 126,506 126,533 99,624 98,626 126,533 126,503 126,533 99,632 98,672 
R-squared 0.991 0.993 0.992 0.994 0.996 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.994 0.996 
Country pair fe YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Reporter*year fe YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Partner*year fe YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country pair clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
^ three years lags from the entry into force of the agreement        
Note: dirDVA stands for direct domestic value added, DVX indirect value added, FVA foreign value added, dirRDV domestic value added that returns home directly 
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Table 3. Weighted tariffs: agriculture and food GVCs components for All countries  
      Agriculture         Food     
  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) 
Dep Var: dirDVA DVX FVA dirRDV MVA dirDVA DVX FVA dirRDV MVA 
                     
tariff rate (applied weighted mean)_ji ^^ -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
tariff rate (applied weighted mean)_ij ^^    -0.003* 0.001    -0.012*** -0.009*** 
    (0.002) (0.002)    (0.001) (0.002) 
RTA (yes=1)^ 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.015** -0.004 0.014** 0.014*** 0.014** 0.024*** -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
           
Observations 518,017 517,890 520,676 407,729 406,447 518,805 518,687 520,676 407,867 406,667 
R-squared 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.997 0.998 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.998 0.998 
Country pair fe YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Reporter*year fe YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Partner*year fe YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country pair clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
^ three years lags from the entry into force of the agreement         
^^ one year lag           
Note: dirDVA stands for direct domestic value added, DVX indirect value added, FVA foreign value added, dirRDV domestic value added that returns home directly and MVA 
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Table 4. Weighted tariffs: agriculture and food GVCs components for SSA countries  
      Agriculture         Food     
  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) 
Dep Var: dirDVA DVX FVA dirRDV MVA dirDVA DVX FVA dirRDV MVA 
                     
tariff rate (applied weighted mean)_ji ^^ -0.006* -0.004 -0.006* -0.003 -0.001 -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
tariff rate (applied weighted mean)_ij ^^    0.003 0.003    -0.008*** -0.005 
    (0.004) (0.005)    (0.003) (0.004) 
RTA (yes=1)^ 0.006 0.011 0.006 0.058*** 0.012 -0.039** -0.027 -0.039** 0.024 -0.010 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) 
           
Observations 121,069 121,042 121,069 92,528 91,601 121,069 121,039 121,069 92,536 91,647 
R-squared 0.991 0.993 0.992 0.994 0.996 0.991 0.991 0.992 0.994 0.996 
Country pair fe YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Reporter*year fe YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Partner*year fe YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country pair clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
^ three years lags from the entry into force of the agreement         
^^ one year lag           
Note: dirDVA stands for direct domestic value added, DVX indirect value added, FVA foreign value added, dirRDV domestic value added that returns home directly and MVA 
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
 












          Agriculture Food 
Angola 0.26 0.04 0.02 0.32 0% 0% 
Benin 0.15 0.09 0.02 0.27 11% 5% 
Botswana 0.16 0.22 0.07 0.44 1% 10% 
Burkina Faso 0.18 0.18 0.06 0.41 22% 3% 
Burundi 0.26 0.13 0.05 0.44 15% 1% 
Cameroon 0.33 0.05 0.03 0.41 15% 2% 
Cape Verde 0.18 0.20 0.06 0.44 1% 3% 
Central African Republic 0.36 0.08 0.04 0.48 11% 1% 
Chad 0.24 0.04 0.02 0.30 28% 0% 
Congo 0.28 0.06 0.03 0.37 3% 0% 
DR Congo 0.46 0.06 0.06 0.58 4% 1% 
Djibouti 0.21 0.13 0.05 0.38 5% 3% 
Eritrea 0.24 0.08 0.03 0.35 4% 2% 
Ethiopia 0.15 0.31 0.12 0.58 31% 5% 
Gabon 0.27 0.04 0.02 0.32 15% 0% 
Gambia 0.22 0.14 0.05 0.41 6% 9% 
Ghana 0.31 0.06 0.03 0.40 34% 14% 
Guinea 0.44 0.06 0.05 0.55 3% 1% 
Ivory Coast 0.25 0.06 0.02 0.33 33% 15% 
Kenya 0.19 0.17 0.04 0.39 30% 15% 
Lesotho 0.11 0.36 0.10 0.58 0% 1% 
Liberia 0.31 0.06 0.03 0.40 15% 0% 
Madagascar 0.22 0.10 0.03 0.35 38% 8% 
Malawi 0.21 0.10 0.03 0.34 39% 8% 
Mali 0.19 0.08 0.02 0.30 23% 2% 
Mauritania 0.23 0.13 0.05 0.41 1% 21% 
Mauritius 0.13 0.31 0.06 0.50 1% 15% 
Mozambique 0.23 0.07 0.03 0.33 22% 7% 
Namibia 0.15 0.23 0.05 0.44 3% 28% 
Niger 0.24 0.12 0.05 0.40 3% 1% 
Nigeria 0.28 0.06 0.02 0.36 4% 1% 
Rwanda 0.23 0.20 0.08 0.51 9% 1% 
Sao Tome and Principe 0.20 0.21 0.08 0.50 7% 2% 
Senegal 0.23 0.09 0.03 0.34 11% 42% 
Seychelles 0.21 0.14 0.05 0.40 1% 36% 
Sierra Leone 0.20 0.16 0.06 0.42 5% 5% 
Somalia 0.21 0.08 0.03 0.33 10% 4% 
South Africa 0.25 0.12 0.06 0.43 4% 2% 
Swaziland 0.13 0.28 0.08 0.49 5% 16% 
Tanzania 0.15 0.24 0.06 0.45 15% 13% 
Togo 0.16 0.12 0.03 0.31 15% 7% 
Uganda 0.19 0.11 0.03 0.32 32% 11% 
Zambia 0.23 0.10 0.04 0.37 6% 2% 
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Table 2A. Variables applied in the empirical analysis: summary statistics 
 
 Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 dirDVA 813,109 3.25 2.48 -5.16 16.33 
 DVX 812,236 1.98 2.50 -7.19 14.99 
 FVA 815,689 0.95 2.63 -6.48 14.72 
Agriculture dirRDV 811,535 -5.00 3.30 -19.38 13.68 
 MVA 810,292 -6.26 3.79 -20.61 14.10 
 tariff rate 563,408 1.80 1.09 0.00 6.62 
 RTA (yes=1) 816,960 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
 
 dirDVA 813,852 3.46 2.80 -7.28 16.78 
 DVX 810,820 -5.52 4.07 -19.98 14.76 
 FVA 812,362 -4.99 3.47 -21.07 13.93 
Food dirRDV 815,694 1.88 2.92 -6.12 15.38 
 MVA 813,118 1.96 2.54 -8.50 15.31 
 tariff rate 563,408 2.45 1.23 0.00 8.01 
 RTA (yes=1) 816,960 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
All variables are in logs. 
Figure 1A. Average import tariff rates for Agriculture and Food, by area 
 
1Aa: Agriculture                                                                                                1Ab: Food 
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Figure 2A. Signed RTAs by area in 1990 and 2013 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Egger and Larch (2008, updated to 2015) database  
 









i The term GVC refers to the global networks of activities required to bring a product from its conception to end use and 
beyond (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011). 
ii The OECD shows that in 2010 the share of traded agricultural products not used for household consumption was 45%, based 
on the United Nations Broad Economic Classification (BEC) system (OECD, 2016). 
iii Some of the terms in the PDC bucket double count value added originated in the home country, while other terms in the 
double count value added originated in foreign countries (WWZ, 2013). 
iv The DVX component includes also the returned value added (RDV), that is the portion of domestic value added that is 
initially exported but ultimately returned home by being embedded in the imports from other countries and consumed at home. 
v Since most of SSA countries lack information on national I-O tables, in order to get a balanced global MRIO, EORA uses 
interpolation and estimation to provide a contiguous, continuous dataset for the period 1990-2013. Therefore, we assume that 
our results are prudent estimates of the phenomena we analyze. In fact, we exclude from our analysis the recently born South 
Sudan (2011), Sudan, and Zimbabwe due to data inconsistency. 
vi Since value added data comes from decomposition of national gross exports in value across countries it is, by construction, 
not possible to derive neither where the agriculture products are grown and harvested, nor where food products are actually 
produced.  
vii Note that the reported measures tend to be inflated by intermediate flows between countries of the same region. This inserts 
a bias in favor of the EU27 relative to other single large countries or smaller regional groups (e.g., NAFTA).  
viii The sum across all the sectors therefore equals the value of total GVC participation reported in Figure 1. 
ix Europeans were interested in exploiting the capacity of African colonies to produce goods that could be consumed in the 
mother country. Hence, they forced or encouraged to orientate colonies’ production towards tradable goods - mainly 
agricultural commodities and raw materials - that could be consumed and/or processed in Europe, or sold on international 
markets. Even after the decolonization process important segments of colonial populations remained involved and dependent 
in this kind of trade with Europe (Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000).  
x In some cases, such as Uganda, Zambia and Niger, the EU absorbs almost 80% of the DVX despite the fact that the main 
destination for their gross exports is Africa.  
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xi In this case, there is also the so called “Rotterdam effect”, that refers to the fact that trade value with the Netherlands is 
artificially inflated by the goods dispatched from or arriving in Rotterdam even though the ultimate destination or country of 
origin differs.   
xii Multilateral resistance has been theoretically demonstrated (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003) and empirically observed 
to bias the effects of bilateral protection on trade (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). 
xiii These capture the effects of time-invariant bilateral trade costs (Piermartini and Yotov, 2016), including time-invariant 
reasons for signing trade agreements, and prevent possible “reverse causality” bias between trade flows and tariffs (Baier and 
Bergstrand, 2007). They also controls for self-selection bias due to the fact that countries that join RTAs are unlikely to be 
randomly chosen. Non-parametric alternatives to the standard gravity specification have also been proposed to account for 
the presence of nonlinearities in the relationship between FTAs, trade flows and the other covariates (Baier and Bergstrand, 
2009; Montalbano and Nenci, 2014). 
xiv WITS uses the concept of effectively applied tariff which is defined as the lowest available tariff. If a preferential tariff 
exists, it will be used as the effectively applied tariff. Otherwise, the MFN applied tariff will be used. The use of the applied 
tariffs controls directly for the actual utilization rates. Here, we use simple averages giving the same weight to all products 
(not imported as well as very large imports). This is because the level of nominal tariffs might influence the effective value 
of imports (e.g., a prohibitive tariff, wearing away imports, and tariff revenue could be interpreted as a zero-tariff rate). This 
problem is not such that it could affect the analysis at the aggregate level (and indeed most of the previous literature actually 
applies weighted averages). However, since tariffs in developing countries are higher than in industrialized countries and are 
very high in absolute terms, specifically in the case of SSA countries and for agriculture and food products, the use of weighted 
average tariffs could lead to incorrect interpretations. Furthermore, weighted tariffs could lead to simultaneity bias in the 
estimated coefficients. For the sake of comparison, in robustness checks, we also present the outcomes of weighted average 
where the imports value (in US dollars) of the reporter country are used as weights, showing that there are no meaningful 
differences between the two estimates. 
xv RTAs are collected on the basis of the date the agreement entered into force and then lagged (t-n) to include the effects 
associated with implementation and phase-in. Data are sourced from Egger and Larch (2008) (for additional details, see also 
Grant and Lambert, 2008) and updated to 2015. Outcomes for alternative temporal lags for RTAs are available upon request. 
xvi The effectively applied tariffs are weighted by the imports value (in US dollars) of the reporter country. We are aware that 
countries may be so locked into trade patterns that lagged values would not substantially differ from the current ones. Hence 
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we tested the same relationship by using alternative temporal lags for tariffs and the results are still consistent. These outcomes 
are available upon request. 
xvii Further robustness checks are provided in the online Supplementary Appendix. Specifically, we compute: i) a Poisson 
maximum-likelihood estimator (PPML) approach to deal with econometric problems resulting from zero bilateral trade flows 
and heteroskedastic residuals in log-linear gravity equations (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006), and ii) an instrumental variable 
approach to possibly deal with the risk of reverse causality. Overall, results are similar to those presented in Section 3. In 
particular, the coefficients on our variables of interest, tariffji and tariffij are consistently negative in all the specifications for 
dirRDV, while as usual ambiguous for MVA.  
 
